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In the first of these cases, Welburn v Dibb LuptonBroomhead [2003] PNLR 28, the Court of Appeal in2002 took what looked like the logical view, and held
he was. The claimant allegedly had to write off a debt
because the solicitors instructed to recover it dragged their
feet, and meanwhile the debtor ceased trading. He sued
the solicitors for professional negligence. But a
complication arose: at the time of the alleged negligence
the claimant himself had been subject to an individual
voluntary arrangement, the effect of which was to transfer
the beneficial interest in the unrecovered debt to his
supervisor, leaving him with bare legal title to it.
The Court of Appeal, taking an apparently pragmatic
line, agreed with the trial judge that even if the claimant
could prove negligence, he had suffered no loss. He had
merely been deprived of something he was not properly
entitled to in any event: and the fact that because of the
technicalities of insolvency law he had held a bare legal title
to it was irrelevant given that the effective, beneficial title
was elsewhere.
Welburn may seem logical: but the practical difficulty
with it is not hard to see. If the claimant could not recover,
it is by no means clear that the supervisor could sue either.
After all, he had not instructed the solicitors; he thus
would have to rely on a common law duty in tort, and this
duty itself might be problematic, given the equitable nature
of his interest. And if the supervisor could not sue, then
the defendant’s liability would simply have disappeared,
sucked into the notorious “legal black hole.” It was this
point, or something like it, that informed Neuberger J
some months later in another legal malpractice case,
Chappell v Somers & Blake [2004] Ch. 19. An executrix
instructed solicitors to distribute the assets of the estate,
including a couple of rental properties. Five years later
nothing had happened, the properties stood empty, and the
would-be legatee had received no rent. The executrix sued
the solicitors for negligence, claiming the lost rentals. The
solicitors riposted that the loss was the legatee’s, and that
this was no skin off the nose of the executrix, who was the
person suing.
Neuberger J, in a careful judgment, had little hesitation
in declining to allow the solicitors to rely on this fact and
holding them liable to pay substantial damages. Wherever
beneficial title might lie (a somewhat awkward question in
the case of undistributed estates), the executrix’s legal title
should be regarded as sufficient to allow her to recover
substantial damages on behalf of whoever might be entitled
under the estate. It was, to say the least, doubtful whether
the legatees could sue: and if they could not, then (echoing
White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207) it was clearly sound policy
that someone should be able to.
Perhaps it is surprising that this point of the trustee’s
ability to recover never seems to have arisen, save in
isolated dicta (eg. Lloyds v Harper (1880) 16 Ch.D 290)
before Chappell. Nevertheless the result in that case, it is
suggested, makes good sense. True, it technically amounts
to giving a claimant damages for loss she has not ultimately
suffered. But no injustice seems to have been done. And
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effectively by giving the trustee title to sue it means that we
reach the result we want, namely that the defendant is
treated as if liable to “the trust” or “the estate” (an abstract
entity whose legal status is otherwise, to say the least,
problematic). Moreover, Chappell has since been followed
at first instance by Laddie J in a genuine trust case,
deciding that the legal owner of trust assets can obtain
substantial damages in conversion, just as he can recover
for breach of contract: see Malkins Nominees Ltd v Société
Financière Mirelis SA [2004] EWHC 2631 (Ch).
Nevertheless, before one concludes that all is well, at
least two problems arise. The first is the relation between
Chappell and the earlier Welburn, which did allow the
defendant to take the “no loss” point. The latter – a Court
of Appeal decision, it will be remembered – was not cited
in Chappell, or for that matter in Malkins; as a result both
later decisions could, theoretically be dismissed as per
incuriam. It is suggested, however, that to deny recovery to
a claimant in the Chappell situation would be most
unfortunate, and that in the event of conflict the courts will
recognise this and try to distinguish Welburn. One possible
ground is that Welburn involved an entirely passive trustee –
someone, indeed, whose legal ownership could rightly be
called a historical technicality – whereas in Chappell the
claimant was emphatically active: like any personal
representative, she had considerable functions and
responsibilities, and thus a real interest in the estate assets.
But the active-passive distinction might be an awkward one
to draw in practice.
More convincing and practical (it is suggested) is the fact
that Welburn, unlike the later decisions, involved insolvency.
In insolvency scenarios there is considerable advantage in
ensuring that the correct person – that is, the party
ultimately entitled to collect the insolvent’s estate for his
creditors, and not the insolvent himself – brings and
controls any relevant legal proceedings. This requirement
does not apply in the case of other trustees or bare legal
owners.
The second problem arises out of a more recent
decision, Rolls-Royce Power Engineering plc v Ricardo Consulting
Engineers Ltd [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 129, [2003] EWHC
2871 (TCC). In that case two companies, A and its parent
RRPE, collaborated on the development of a new diesel
engine: A handled the contracting and RRPE the actual
development. Project consultants engaged by A for RRPE’s
benefit allegedly botched their job; as a result RRPE
suffered loss in carrying out the project. The classic
problem thus arose: A, as contractors, had suffered no loss,
while RRPE, the sufferers, could not enforce the contract.
A and PPRE sought to get round this problem in a number
of ways, including an argument that A had contracted as
trustees for RRPE and could thus recover substantial
damages. HHJ Seymour Q.C., while accepting that a
trustee might be able to sue, held that this right was limited
to where the other contracting party knew of his status as
trustee: where he was not so aware, then the defendant was
able to take the “no loss” point.
With respect, this seems a needless limitation on a
relatively straightforward doctrine. Suppose a defendant
contracts to sell land to a buyer who is actually trustee for
someone else, and then fails to make good title. It would
be odd if no damages were payable for wasted
conveyancing expenses, etc., on the ground that the trustee
suffered no loss and the defendant did not know that he
was merely contracting as trustee. This is not necessarily to
say that the defendant’s knowledge (or lack of it) as to the
existence of a trust should always be irrelevant. If the loss
suffered is not a standardised one, but some consequential
damage peculiar to the beneficiary’s particular
circumstances, then there is much to be said for denying
liability. But for ordinary foreseeable losses it is suggested
that the trustee ought to be allowed to recover as of course.
To the extent that the Rolls-Royce case suggests the contrary,
it should, with respect, be regarded as open to
reconsideration.
In conclusion, the position as regards a trustee’s rights
should be simple. Except as regards insolvency and
specialised losses referable only to the beneficiary’s own
position, a trustee should be able to recover losses in the
ordinary way without reference to the fact that he is a
trustee, which no doubt he will then hold on trust for the
beneficiary in the ordinary way.
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